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legislatures. Id. at 2711. O'Connor acknowledged that
Oklahoma has enacted a statute that authorizes capital punish-
ment for murder, without setting any minimum age at which
the commission of murder may lead to the imposition of that
sentence. Id. That State has also, quite separately, provided that
15-year-old murder defendants may be treated as adults in some
circumstances. Id. Because the State proceeded in this manner,
there is a considerable risk that the Oklahoma legislature either
did not realize that its actions would have the effect of render-
ing 15-year-old defendants death-eligible or did not give the
question the serious consideration that would have been
reflected in the explicit choice of some minimum age for death-
eligibility. Id. Justice O'Connor concluded that petitioner and
others who were below the age of 16 at the time of their of-
fense may not be executed under the authority of a capital
punishment statute that specifies no minimum age at which the
commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender's execu
tion. Id.
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
The Court's conclusion in Thompson, that petitioner and
others whose crimes were committed before the age of 16 may
not be executed pursuant to a capital punishment statute that
specifies no minimum age, applies directly to Virginia. No
minimum age for the imposition of the death penalty is express-
ly stated in the Virginia statutes relating to the death penalty.
(see Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-31 and 19.2-264.2 to 19.264.5
(Repl. 1983 and Supp. 1987). In addition, §16.1-269(A) of the
Virginia Code provides that an offender may be waived from
juvenile to criminal court when charged with first-degree
murder. Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269(A) (1982).
Although the opinion in Thompson was a plurality, with
Justice O'Connor concurring in the judgment only, O'Connor
seems to agree with the plurality that "petitioner and others
who were below the age of 16 at the time of their offense may
not be executed under the authority of a capital punishment
statute that specifies no minimum age at which the commission
of a capital crime can lead to the offender's execution." 108
S.Ct. at 2711.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion leaves the Eighth
Amendment question to legislatures and does not conclude that
it is unconstitutional per se to execute any person who was
under the age of 16 at the time of the crime. However, until
legislatures address this issue squarely, it appears that a death
sentence for an offender who was 1) under the age of 16 at the
time of the offense and 2) tried in adult criminal court in a
state (such as Virginia) which has not set a minimum age for




The United States Constitution is the cornerstone on which
the country bases its conception of justice. The Eighth Amend-
ment forbids the use of "cruel or unusual punishment."
However, the definition of "cruel" and "unusual" is not a fix-
ed concept, it is based on "evolving standards of decency which
mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The framers of the Constitution did not
perceive capital punishment as an unconstitutional penalty for
various criminal conduct. This is evidenced by the fact that the
Fifth Amendment due process clause speaks of deprivation of
"life." Under this framework the death penalty can be held un-
constitutional any time the United States Supreme Court decides
that "evolving standards of decency" mandate such a decision.
In 1972 the United States Supreme Court held the death
penalty, as administered by the states, unconstitutional on
Eighth Amendment procedural grounds. The Court's ruling in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) did not hold that the
death penalty, per se, violated the Eighth Amendment of the
Constitution, but that the sentencing procedure ran a risk that
the death penalty would be administered in an arbitrary and
capricious manner. Furman at 242. By 1976 state legislatures
adopted two types of capital punishment statutes. The United
States Supreme Court held the mandatory death penalty statutes
unconstitutional. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976). However, the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's.
Florida's and Texas' guided jury discretion death penalty
statutes which substantially increased the "process" required to
convict a defendant to death, including a bifurcated trial com-
posed of a guilt stage and a penalty stage. Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976),
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The sentencer must make
an individualized decision as to the appropriateness of the death
penalty in each case, Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983),
and must consider any relevant mitigating factor which may
support a sentence of life. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978). The Court has required a higher level of reliability in a
death penalty sentencing stage than in other sentencing pro-
ceedings because of the unique nature of the death penalty.
Barefoot v. Estelle 463 U.S. 880, 924 (1983).
Substantively, the Supreme Court held that the sanction
must "comport with the basic concept of human dignity at the
core of the [Eighth] Amendment." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182. In
deciding whether any punishment violates human dignity, the
Supreme Court stated that the state must have "penological
justification" for inforcing the punishment. Id. at 183. With
regard to the death penalty, the Court requires that the imposi-
tion of the penalty serves as retribution or deterrence of capital
crimes. Id. (See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
Ever since states have been actively enforcing the death
penalty, litigation has reflected the continuing struggle as socie-
ty attempts to find a just means to determine which criminals
are worthy of death. The United States Supreme Court has im-
posed both substantive and procedural limitations on the im-
position of the death penalty. These procedural and substantive
concerns outlined by the Supreme Court lead to the intricacy
and complexity of capital litigation. Many of these concerns are
directed primarily to insuring fairness at the trial level. In
subsequent articles we will address the remaining stages of the
capital case.
